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The effects of losing business group 
affiliation 
 
Borja Larrain, Giorgo Sertsios, and Francisco Urzúa I. 
 
Abstract 
We propose a novel identification strategy for estimating the effects of business group 
affiliation. We study two-firm business groups, some of which split up during the sample period, 
leaving some firms as stand-alones. We instrument for stand-alone status using shocks to the industry 
of the other group firm. We find that firms that become stand-alone reduce leverage and 
investment. Consistent with collateral cross-pledging, the effects are more pronounced when the 
other firm had high tangibility. Consistent with capital misallocation in groups, the reduction in 
leverage is stronger in firms that had low (high) profitability (leverage) relative to industry peers. 
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Business groups –sets of firms with a common controlling shareholder— are frequent in both 
developed and developing countries. They account for more than 20% of stock market capitalization 
in Western Europe and, in many Asian countries, their assets represent up to 70% of GDP (Morck, 
Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005). A firm’s affiliation to a business group is an endogenous process for 
which different authors have suggested different rationales. It can, for example, be argued that 
profitable firms use their abundant cash flow to form business groups around them (Almeida and 
Wolfenzon, 2006a) and that weak firms need the support of business groups to survive (Gopalan, 
Nanda, and Seru, 2007). Precisely because business group affiliation is not randomly distributed in 
the economy, it is hard to estimate its causal effects (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). In this paper, we 
propose a novel identification strategy for estimating the effects of business group affiliation on 
capital structure and investment. 
Our strategy is based on two building blocks. First, we study the effects of loss of affiliation 
to a business group. A firm in a business group is inherently different from a stand-alone firm so one 
cannot rely on purely cross-sectional comparisons of group firms and stand-alone firms. By focusing 
on a particular firm that changes its status, and hence delving into within-firm variation, one can 
partially attack the endogeneity problem and omitted variable bias that affect cross-sectional 
comparisons. More precisely, the first building block of our strategy is a differences-in-differences 
approach where we compare changes in firms that transit from business groups to stand-alone status 
with those in firms that remain in a business group. 
Studying firms that change status is, however, only a partial solution to the endogeneity 
problem because those that become stand-alone are far from a random sample. One could argue that 
firms leave a business group precisely when affiliation destroys value. A similar problem occurs when 
studying conglomerate spin-offs (Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein, 2002). For this reason, our 
identification strategy needs a second crucial ingredient: the ability to find firms that exogenously 
become stand-alone.  
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We study groups composed of only two firms and instrument for a firm’s stand-alone status 
using negative shocks to the industry of which the other firm in the group is part. Such shocks can 
force the sale of this other firm, leaving the firm being studied as a stand-alone, not by choice but 
arguably by chance. In our setting not all firms that become stand-alone receive a shock to the industry 
of the other firm in the group, and not all industry shocks to one firm produce a group split. These 
shocks only allow us to isolate the fraction of transitions to standalone status that is exogenous. So, 
the second building block of our strategy is an instrumental variables (IV) approach on top of the 
previous differences-in-differences. 
We exploit industrial shocks that can be cleanly identified such as commodity shocks (e.g., 
in milk, aluminum and wood pulp) and regulatory shocks (e.g., the tobacco industry). For the purposes 
of our strategy, the two firms in the group should operate in unrelated industries in order to guard 
against contagion of the shock to the firm being studied (Whited, 2001) since this would violate the 
exclusion restriction in the IV setting. By studying groups with firms in unrelated industries, we are 
testing the effects of both conglomeration (being associated with other firms under a common 
ownership structure) and diversification. This joint hypothesis has been the focus of interest in the 
literature since business groups are typically diversified across several industries (see Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007).  
Our data come from the universe of European private firms in Amadeus for the years 2009-
2013. A particular advantage of Amadeus is that it provides information on ownership structures, and 
hence we can identify pairs of firms with a common controlling shareholder. We find that becoming 
stand-alone has a strong negative effect on leverage and asset growth in the IV regressions that use 
shocks to the other firm as an instrument for stand-alone status, with leverage falling by close to 10% 
and asset growth by close to 20%. These results indicate that capital structure and investment are 
different in groups and stand-alone firms.  
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One explanation for our results is that business groups relax credit constraints. In line with 
credit constraints, we find that the results are stronger among firms in debt-dependent industries (on 
the lines of the financial dependence discussed by Rajan and Zingales, 1998) and in countries with 
less developed banking systems as measured by the ratio of domestic credit to GDP. In terms of 
specific mechanisms, our evidence suggests the existence of collateral cross-pledging between firms 
in the same group. The assets of one firm can be used as collateral for the debt of the other, increasing 
financing as compared to a situation in which both firms are stand-alone. Consistent with this, we 
find that reductions in leverage and asset growth are more pronounced when the other firm 
contributed more tangible assets to the group. Our results are not consistent with other types of cross-
pledging and, in particular, we find no evidence of cash-flow transfers between firms. 
The above tests indicate that firms in business groups have access to more funds, resulting in 
higher leverage and investment. However, more funds can be harmful if business groups use capital 
inefficiently. For example, groups can give some firms more capital than is justified by investment 
opportunities (e.g., pet projects). Consistent with this misallocation of capital, we find that firms 
which reduce leverage most as they become stand-alone are precisely those that appear to have been 
previously over-investing with subsidized financing. We find that firms that had initial profitability 
below that of their industry peers and initial leverage above that of their industry peers see their 
leverage ratios fall by more when becoming stand-alone. In addition, firms that had industry Tobin’s 
Q below the other firm in the group experience a stronger fall in leverage. Overall, we do not find 
that becoming stand-alone has a negative effect on accounting measures of performance. This 
suggests that the misallocation of capital is not severe enough to overturn the benefits of business 
group affiliation.   
Our paper is related to the literature that showcases the costs and benefits of business group 
affiliation. Business groups can harm firms by engaging in unproductive activities or through the 
outright expropriation of minority shareholders (i.e., “tunneling” as in Johnson, La Porta, López-de-
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Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000; Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002). They can, however, also help 
firms by relaxing financial constraints (e.g., Almeida, Park, Subrahmanyam, and Wolfenzon, 2011; 
Bena and Ortiz-Molina, 2013; Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru, 2014). In particular, Buchuk, Larrain, 
Muñoz, and Urzúa (2014) study the use of intra-group loans in Chile to finance the investment of 
capital-intensive firms. Similarly, Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015) show that Korean groups were able 
to sustain investment in high-growth firms during the Asian crisis through cross-equity investments. 
Both of these papers study the endogenous selection of firms into providers and receivers of capital 
within a group. Macroeconomic shocks, such as the Asian crisis or the 2008-9 crisis studied by Lins, 
Volpin, and Wagner (2013), provide a good source of identification of short-run differences between 
group and non-group firms. Common to these analyses is that they implicitly assume that affiliation 
to a business group is fixed or very sticky in the short run. Our setup provides a more frontal attack 
at the estimation of business group effects on capital structure and investment by looking at 
exogenous variation in affiliation. Also, by studying heterogeneity in these effects we can shed light 
on particular mechanisms not studied before, such as collateral cross-pledgeability. 
We contribute to the literature by estimating causal effects of business group affiliation using 
a novel identification strategy based on small and diversified groups. Most of the literature has 
focused on large groups of numerous listed firms, rather than our small groups of two private firms. 
Many of the mechanisms studied in the literature, such as financial constraints, are still present and 
even more relevant in small groups. Some costs, such as tunneling, are not relevant in our sample 
given the high levels of ownership concentration. As in many other settings, the trade-off between 
identification and external validity is present in the sense that, in order to improve identification, we 
have to use a particular setup. Other contemporaneous work follows a similar path, although the 
authors study different trade-offs and mechanisms. For example, Pérez-González (2015) estimates a 
related causal effect for holding companies, with an identification strategy based on the deregulation 
of U.S. power utilities in the 1930s. Shi (2015) studies the effects of business group affiliation using 
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changes in the ownership chain two or more levels away from the firm of interest. Our findings, 
combined with causal estimates from other settings, can advance in achieving external validity above 
and beyond the specific features of each setup. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on internal capital markets, which has studied the 
allocation of capital mostly (albeit not exclusively) in U.S. conglomerates (Stein, 2003). The 
theoretical underpinnings are similar to those for the costs and benefits of conglomerates. Rent-
seeking behavior by divisional managers and power struggles can distort allocation of capital between 
divisions (Matvos and Seru, 2014; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). On the other hand, conglomerates may have financial advantages and 
be better at picking winner projects (Giroud and Mueller, 2015; Khanna and Tice, 2001; Shin and 
Stulz, 1998; Stein, 1997). Although similar trade-offs apply to the allocation of capital both within 
conglomerates and within business groups, there is one important difference that we exploit to our 
advantage. Conglomerates are composed of one firm with multiple divisions, but one balance sheet. 
Although the degree of industrial diversification can be the same in conglomerates as in business 
groups, business groups are composed of independent corporations, each with its own balance sheet 
and ownership structure. This implies that the effects of affiliation on capital structure can be 
measured directly in business groups.  
Section 1 of this paper describes the empirical design of the study and the data used. Section 
2 presents the main results regarding leverage and asset growth while Section 3 explores the 
mechanisms behind our main results, with an emphasis on collateral cross-pledging. In Section 4, the 
assumptions behind the IV design, particularly the exclusion restriction, and alternative hypotheses 
for our findings are discussed and, in Section 5, we present our conclusions.  
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1. Empirical Design 
1.1. Identification strategy 
We start with a sample of firms associated in pairs or small business groups. In this sample, 
we study the effects of loss of affiliation to the business group, i.e., the “treatment” consists of 
becoming a stand-alone firm. “Control” firms are those firms that remain in a group. The fundamental 
economic problem we face is that the treatment does not occur randomly. In general, firms become 
stand-alone by choice. Hence, estimating the treatment effect of becoming a stand-alone is 
challenging.   
We can think of the following IV system:  
	 :	 	 	 ′ 					 1  
	 :	 	 	 .																							 2  
Equation (2) is the main regression of interest. We regress firm outcome  on the dummy 
 that takes a value of 1 if firm i is stand-alone in year t, and 0 otherwise. We control for 
shocks to the same industry ( ) and lagged firm characteristics in vector . Time-
invariant unobservable variables that could explain the selection into business groups are captured by 
firm fixed effects . For example, it could be argued that firms in particular industries are more prone 
to form groups or that managerial quality or preferences explain the industrial diversification of 
business groups. As long as these characteristics are time-invariant, they will be absorbed by the firm 
fixed effect. We also control for time fixed effects . 
Regression (2) is, in essence, a differences-in-differences regression. The  
dummy allows for a before-and-after comparison in firms that become stand-alone. Firms that remain 
in a group (i.e., control firms) are also included in regression (2) and allow us to estimate dynamic 
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effects (captured by ) and macro effects (captured by ) more precisely. The null hypotheses is 
that 0 since, in a frictionless world, ownership status should not affect outcomes such as capital 
structure or investment policies. The problem is that the typical OLS estimate of  does not 
correspond to the causal effect of becoming stand-alone. For example, the life cycle of a firm can 
simultaneously affect productivity and stand-alone status. In terms of equation (2), unobserved 
productivity contained in  can affect the outcome , but also the decision to become stand-alone, 
so the standard exogeneity assumption of OLS does not hold. In short, in order to talk about causality, 
we need an instrument for .  
The instrument we propose consists of industrial shocks to the other firm in the group. The 
idea behind our instrument is depicted in stylized form in Figure 1. Think of a group with two firms, 
Firm 1 and Firm 2, controlled by owner A, of which Firm 1 receives a severe negative shock and is 
shortly sold to another owner (owner C) or disappears. Alternatively (not shown in the figure as a 
possibility), Firm 2 is sold to a different owner who does not own other firms.1 In either case, the 
shock to Firm 1 results in Firm 2 becoming stand-alone. The key element in our identification strategy 
is that the shock allows us to identify exogenous changes in the status of Firm 2. As a control, we use 
Firm 3 in a different business group under a different owner (owner B), selected through a one-to-
one matching procedure with Firm 2 that is explained below. This Firm 3 remains in a business group 
throughout the sample period and the other firm in its group (Firm 4) may or may not receive shocks.   
It is becoming stand-alone, not a shock to the other firm in the group, that is the treatment of 
interest in our setup. Since not all firms become stand-alone because the other firm in the group 
receives a shock and not all shocks produce group splits, the instrument does not have to explain all 
potential transitions to stand-alone status, but only isolate those that are arguably exogenous. Firms 
                                                            
1 85% of the firms that become stand-alone in our sample stay with the original owner. 
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that remain in a group are useful precisely to obtain better estimates of the role of shocks in producing 
transitions to stand-alone status. 
Our empirical strategy is a combination of a differences-in-differences design and 
instrumental variables. Throughout the paper, we use the control-treated dichotomy that is standard 
in differences-in-differences setups. In our case, however, the actual “treated” firm picked up by the 
IV system is a firm that is induced to become stand-alone when the other firm in the group is hit by a 
shock and the actual “control” firm, or counterfactual in the regression, is a composite rather than a 
single type of firm that we can point to in the data. For simplicity, we keep the standard control-
treated dichotomy, although the above caveat should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. 
Equation (1) is our first-stage regression where  is the instrument for the stand-
alone status of each firm. We estimate (1) with OLS, hence the first stage is a linear probability model 
since  is a dichotomous variable. Like any instrument,  has to obey the 
exclusion restriction and has to be relevant.  
We note two things in terms of the exclusion restriction. First, the instrument is at the industry 
level, not the firm level, so it is easier to argue that variation is exogenous to the managerial skills of 
the controlling shareholder. For example, a measure of shocks based on the earnings of the other firm 
would most likely be contaminated with these skills. For our identification strategy, the key is that 
the shock is exogenous to the business group itself, but we do not argue that the shock is exogenous 
to market forces in general. (For example, the shock to the construction sector in the sample period 
is likely to be endogenous to the financial crisis). Second, the two firms in our business groups are in 
unrelated industries, as measured by coefficients of the input-output matrix as explained below. If the 
industries were related, it could be argued that spillovers other than through the ownership structure 
may explain our results (e.g., through customer-supplier links).  
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In order to avoid the case of a weak instrument, we focus on groups with only two firms. In 
larger groups, the link between a shock to one firm and the stand-alone status of the other firm is 
more tenuous or potentially endogenous.2 For instance, in a group of four firms in four unrelated 
industries, a shock to one of them would leave three unaffected firms for potential use in our 
regression setup. However, if one firm is sold and leaves the group, it is less plausible to argue that it 
was exogenously forced into stand-alone status since the group could have sold any of the three 
unaffected firms.  
   
1.2. Industrial Shocks 
In order to identify the shocks in  and , we proceed in a reverse 
engineering fashion by first identifying candidate shocks based on the stock returns of listed firms. 
We compute six-month rolling windows of returns for four-digit SIC industrial portfolios in each 
European stock market during the past decade. Within this universe, we select the returns in the lowest 
5% of the distribution during the years that are relevant for our business group data. In this sample, 
we first check that poor returns are sufficiently widespread in the industry and not driven by 
idiosyncratic shocks to a few firms. Then we check, by hand, in the press or analyst reports, the type 
of shock that likely caused the negative return and eliminate those cases where we are unable to pin 
down the source of the shock precisely. In about a fifth of the cases, we could identify the source of 
the shock, ranging from commodity-related shocks (e.g., metals, grains and livestock) to regulatory 
decisions (e.g., safety laws and tobacco-related laws). Overall, we identify 359 country-industry-year 
shocks, out of which 322 are commodity shocks and 37 are regulatory shocks. Only ten are country-
                                                            
2 For example, the effect of shocks on becoming stand-alone is weaker in a sample of three-firm business groups 
than in our main sample of two-firm business groups. The sample of three-firm business groups that we 
compiled is much smaller than our main sample. Only 889 firms initially belong to a three-firm business group 
of industrially-unrelated firms. 
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industry specific shocks and the rest affect an entire industry in Europe. Panel A of Table A.1 in the 
Appendix summarizes our selection process. 
Figure 2 shows two examples of the shocks in our sample. The first is related to safety regulation 
in the games and toys industry in June 2009, with a trough of about -25% in six-month returns  
observed a couple of months afterwards. The second corresponds to the poor returns (almost -20%) 
of the prepared meats industry in late 2011 and early 2012, which go hand-in-hand with a 42% decline 
in the price of lamb in 12 months. Although the returns we show are for listed firms, the nature of the 
shocks suggests that they also affected private firms. More examples of industrial shocks in our 
sample can be found in the Appendix.  
We are conservative in the identification of shocks in the sense that our final sample only contains 
shocks that we could identify with confidence. As a consequence, we focus on relatively large and 
long-lasting shocks that produce deep and widespread changes in the respective industry. In 
particular, we show in the Appendix (Table A.2) that our shocks are related to industry-wide M&A 
activity. From Zephyr, we take data on M&A transactions at the four-digit SIC code in Europe in  
2009-2013 and show that the number of deals in an industry-year is positively correlated with our 
shocks. In line with previous literature, economic shocks such as more expensive inputs or tighter 
regulation are correlated with merger waves and industry-wide consolidation (Harford, 2005; 
Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996).  
 
1.3. Firm-level Data 
We obtain firm-level data from Amadeus, the database assembled by Bureau van Dijk that 
provides both accounting and ownership information on private and public firms in Europe. Amadeus’ 
accounting data includes balance sheet and profit and loss numbers that can be easily accessed 
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through WRDS. The ownership data cannot be directly downloaded and was obtained from Amadeus’ 
DVDs at a yearly frequency. This data includes the names of the controlling shareholders and their 
ownership stakes as well as information about whether the controlling shareholder is a family, an 
individual, a publicly listed firm or other type of corporation.  
 We collect data for 16 Western European countries in 2009-2013. In many countries, 
coverage for small firms prior to 2009 is sparse. After 2009, and since firms in Europe have strict 
reporting requirements, Amadeus’ coverage is almost equivalent to the universe of firms. There are, 
for instance, 8.6 million firms in 2011. We focus on business groups controlled by either families or 
individuals, which represent 1.3 million firms. The minimum ownership stake we require to consider 
a family or individual as controlling shareholder is 50%. All firms are privately held.   
A crucial step for our identification strategy is to focus on business groups of only two firms 
incorporated in the same country. One example is the group controlled by Sergio Traversa in Vicenza, 
Italy. In 2010, he held controlling stakes in a company producing cushions and fabrics for garden 
furniture (Lollo Due SRL) and in a vineyard (Ongaresca Societa’ Agricola SRL).  
Firms are considered to become stand-alone in the year when there is no other firm in the 
sample with the same controlling shareholder. This can happen because of the sale of either firm to a 
different owner or if the other firm in the group goes bankrupt.3  Having identified firms belonging 
to two-firm business groups, we eliminate groups whose firms are in well-integrated industries. 
Following Fan and Goyal (2006), we construct a measure of vertical integration based on the U.S. 
input-output matrix. Using this matrix we compute the fraction of input (output) that an industry 
acquires (sells) from (to) other industries. Then, for each business group, we compute the average of 
what the industry of each firm sells to the industry of the other firm and, conversely, what it buys 
                                                            
3 Bankruptcy is infrequent in our sample (less than 5% of cases). Our results are robust to excluding these 
cases. 
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from the industry of the other firm. The group is eliminated if this average is larger than 1%. Similarly, 
we exclude groups where both firms are in the same three-digit SIC code.4 Overall, a little under 1% 
of firms in Amadeus (e.g., 81,275 firms in 2011) meet the criterion of belonging at some point to a 
business group with two firms in unrelated industries.  
To further ensure the data’s quality and homogeneity, we apply several restrictions. First, we 
restrict the sample to those firms that, during their first year in the sample, are part of a two-firm 
business group (i.e., we drop firms that were not originally in a two-firm business group and become 
a business group during the sample period). Second, we eliminate firms with less than four years of 
data and with annual asset growth below -90% or above 200%. Third, we ensure that the firms that 
remain in a two-firm business group and firms that become stand-alone are as similar as possible. To 
do this, we perform a one-to-one propensity score matching, based on the two-digit SIC code and size 
(book assets) in the initial year in the sample.5 Figure 3 shows the distribution of size in both sets of 
firms. As expected from the matching procedure, both distributions are basically overlapping. 
Our final sample consists of 3,843 firms that transit to stand-alone status during our sample 
period, representing 16,105 annual observations, and 3,843 firms that remain in a two-firm business 
group, representing 15,762 annual observations. Although perhaps not small in size, this sample 
represents only a tiny fraction of the original Amadeus universe. Satisfying our strict selection criteria 
implies discarding millions of firms, including all observations from four countries (Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland). 
                                                            
4 Our results are also robust to excluding firms in the same two-digit SIC code, which represent less than 5% 
of the observations. 
5 Matching on additional criteria (on top of industry and assets) reduces our sample size too much.  
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The Appendix shows the industrial shocks that we are able to match to the business group 
data (Table A.1, Panel B).6 We consider a match to exist if there is a firm in our business group data 
for the country-industry-year of the shock, and up to two years later. We consider the years after the 
shock because divestiture decisions can take time to materialize. We are not able to match all of the 
shocks because not all affected industries are represented among business groups. Out of the initial 
359 shocks, we have firms in industries affected by 121 shocks, and, in the case of 119 shocks, firms 
in other industries paired with firms directly affected by the shock. 
One example in the sample is provided by a group in Germany. In 2009, two firms - Bernhard 
Upmann Verpackungsmaschinen, a manufacturer of calibration, weighing and packaging machines, 
and Backenecker Liegenschafts-verwaltungs, a real estate agency – were 100% owned by the same 
individual, Johannes Backenecker. In November 2009, the European Commission issued a directive 
on maximum possible errors in measuring instruments, triggering poor returns in this industry. In 
2010, the manufacturing firm was sold to three partners, each of whom took a 33.33% stake. As from 
2011, the real estate agency, therefore, operated as a stand-alone business under Johannes 
Backenecker, who kept a 100% stake.  
Table 1 describes the composition of our sample by year, country and industry. It is relatively 
well balanced. Some differences can be expected because of country size while others are related to 
regulatory standards for reporting data on private firms. Germany accounts for the largest share of 
observations, followed by Italy, Norway, Austria, Spain and the UK. There is no cluster of 
observations in any particular industry. SIC 5 (wholesale and retail trade) accounts for the largest 
share of observations but is still less than 25% of the sample. SIC 6 (financials) includes real estate 
                                                            
6 Given the SIC-code availability in the business group database, we aggregate shocks from the four-digit up to 
the three-digit SIC-code level in the merged sample. We initially look at shocks at the four-digit level so we 
have a better understanding of the shocks (their nature, source, duration, etc.). 
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agencies and small service firms (e.g., consulting and accounting services), but does not include banks 
or large financial intermediaries.  
Figure 4 shows the distribution of observations according to the industry of both firms in the 
business group. We split observations into those pairs with shocks to the industry of the other firm 
and those with no such shocks. The purpose of the figure is to show that there is no cluster of 
observations, with or without shocks, in any particular industry that could bias the results later on. 
For example, it seems hard to tell a selection story along the lines of “firms in industry X are typically 
paired with firms in industry Y that received more shocks in this sample period.” 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the main variables in our analysis. Panel A shows 
firms that eventually become stand-alone (treated firms) while Panel B shows firms that remain in a 
group throughout the period (control firms). We have between 10,000 and 16,000 observations for 
each variable in each panel, except for OROA (operating return on assets=EBIT/book assets), for 
which we have only about 6,000 observations. Average firm characteristics such as size (book assets 
in millions of euros), leverage, tangibility, and others are remarkably similar across treated and 
control firms. Asset growth is our main proxy for investment since CAPEX is typically unreported in 
our sample (more than 70% of observations are zero). Following Leary and Roberts (2005), we define 
debt (or equity) issue or retirement as dummy variables for firm-year observations where the change 
in debt (or equity) is at least 5% of lagged book assets. The controlling shareholder’s stake is generally 
above 95% so minority shareholders are almost non-existent in this sample.7 Averages for the dummy 
variables representing shocks correspond to the frequency of being hit by a shock. For both treated 
and control firms, between one-fifth and one-quarter of observations are hit by shocks. This 
                                                            
7 There are minority shareholders in only 18% of the firms in our sample, and the controlling stake is still on 
average 85% in those firms with minority stakes. Our results change little if we exclude firms with minority 
shareholders from the sample. 
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underlines that not all firms become stand-alone as a result of shocks, and not all shocks induce firms 
to become stand-alone. 
We also compute ratios of characteristics of the other firm in the group to those of the firm 
being studied (i.e., other/own). For instance, relative tangibility is the ratio of PPE (property, plant 
and equipment) of the two firms in the group. Relative Tobin’s Q (at the industry level), relative 
OROA and relative equity are computed analogously. Sales correlation is computed as the correlation 
coefficient between sales growth of the industries of the two firms in U.S. data. Pair characteristics 
are on average very similar across treated and control firms. This implies that the business groups 
which split do not differ, on average, from the business groups that stay together. For example, groups 
that split do not on average show more disparity between their firms in terms of tangibility, Tobin’s 
Q or OROA or have a higher sales correlation than other groups.  
Together with firm characteristics, Table 2 shows industrial and country characteristics. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure the external dependence of an industry as the average fraction of 
investment that is not financed by internal cash flow (everything measured for U.S. industries) and 
equity dependence as the average fraction of investment financed with equity. We compute debt 
dependence as the difference between external dependence and equity dependence. Again, we do not 
find differences between treated and control firms in terms of industry or country characteristics (e.g., 
domestic credit over GDP). 
Finally, we report summary statistics for the creation and destruction of banking 
relationships. Since Amadeus reports the names of the banks with which each firm has a relationship 
each year, we know whether the firm starts a relationship with a bank (creation) or finishes a 
relationship (destruction). As expected in a sample of small firms, the average and median numbers 
of banking relationships are just one. The average of creation and destruction is 0.1 per year. 
Unfortunately, we do not know the amount of credit or the corresponding interest rate. 





2. Main Results 
2.1. Effects on capital structure and asset growth 
Table 3 shows the results for our first stage (with the sample corresponding to the subsequent 
second-stage leverage regressions). The dummy variable for stand-alone status is the dependent 
variable. The explanatory shocks correspond to indicator variables that take a value of 1 in the year 
of a given shock and the following two years, and 0 otherwise. We show the coefficient for shocks in 
the industry of the other firm in the group (the instrument) and for shocks in the same industry (not 
an instrument). Lagged variables ( ) include log assets of the firm, tangibility and the Tobin’s Q 
of the industry. The estimated coefficient for  ranges from 0.0889 to 0.1120, implying 
that shocks to the other industry have a sizeable impact on the likelihood of becoming a stand-alone. 
The coefficient for own industry shock is only slightly higher (between 0.0902 and 0.1285). We do 
not claim that these two shocks explain all transitions to stand-alone status. The R-squared is less than 
40% in all specifications, meaning that there is a substantial unexplained variation in stand-alone 
status in the data. We are interested in the fraction of variation in stand-alone status that is exogenous, 
which we identify with the portion explained by . The large F-statistics confirm that 
the instrument is strong, making it unlikely that there is an “IV blow-up” problem in the second stage 
as suggested by Jiang (2017).  
Table 4, Panel A shows the results for the second stage of the IV system. The effect of 
becoming stand-alone on leverage ranges from -0.0866 to -0.1034, implying that the reduction in 
leverage is approximately one-third of the standard deviation of leverage in the sample (Table 2). The 
different specifications in Table 4 vary according to whether control variables ( ) are used or not 
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and whether the sample is restricted for availability of these controls. Including control variables 
reduces the sample size from 27,000 to approximately 19,000 observations, but the coefficient on 
 remains significant and of similar magnitude throughout.8 Irrespective of the 
specification and sample, the effect is significant at least at the 5% level. The effect on asset growth 
ranges from -0.1562 and -0.2239 and is always significant at the 5% level at the least. The effect of 
becoming stand-alone is stronger on growth than on leverage since it represents about three-quarters 
of the standard deviation of asset growth in the sample (Table 2).  
The OLS regressions (Panel B in Table 4) show no impact of becoming stand-alone on either 
leverage or asset growth. OLS estimates are likely to be smaller (in magnitude) than IV estimates 
because many firms become stand-alone intentionally when they have little to lose or when it is more 
convenient to do so. In other words, many firms self-select into stand-alone status, biasing the results 
against a negative effect on leverage and growth. The IV procedure allows us to isolate those firms 
that receive the treatment unintentionally and estimate the causal effect of business group affiliation, 
rather than the selection of firms into business groups. 
Figure 5 illustrates our main results in an event-study fashion. We define year zero as the 
year when a firm becomes stand-alone and plot firm outcomes before and after the event. Given that 
our IV strategy uses shocks to other firms as instrument, we differentiate between treated firms that 
face shocks to the other firm and those that do not. Both types of treated firms transit to stand-alone 
status in the sample, but the ones that become stand-alone after a shock to the other firm arguably do 
it for exogenous reasons. Since not all firms have data for the entire window, and not all firms transit 
to stand-alone in the same year, we first compute differences between two consecutive years for each 
firm. We then take the average of these differences across all firms in each event year. We repeat this 
for the control firm paired with each treated firm at the beginning of the sample. Finally, we add back 
                                                            
8 Our results are also robust to including country-year fixed effects as seen in Table A.3 of the Appendix. 
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the average initial level of each variable to each subsample of firms: i) firms that become stand-alone 
and do not face shocks to the other firm, ii) firms that become stand-alone and face shocks to the 
other firm, iii) control firms with shocks to the other firm, and iv) control firms without shocks to the 
other firm.  
Panel A shows our results for leverage. The negative trend is consistent with the overall 
reduction in leverage seen after the financial crisis.  More importantly, firms that become stand-alone 
and face shocks to the other firm in the group experience a strong reduction in leverage after becoming 
stand-alone. A similar reduction is not seen in firms that become stand-alone without shocks to the 
other firm. In fact, these other treated firms behave very much like control firms. Panel B shows the 
results for asset growth. They start in year -1 since we have fewer observations for growth rates in 
year -2 (which would imply having data for year -3). Again, the downward trend is clear in years 2 
and 3 only for treated firms that face a shock to the other firm in the group. The main conclusion from 
the figure is that the reduction in leverage and asset growth seen in firms that become stand-alone is 
related to shocks to the other firm in the group, which is consistent with our second-stage results in 
the IV regressions. In other words, Figure 5 illustrates the reduced form of our IV results. 
 
2.2. Decomposing the effect on leverage 
In Table 5 we study the effects on debt and equity separately in order to better understand the 
reduction of leverage when firms become stand-alone. We run regressions with (log) levels and with 
dummy indicators for large issuance or retirement of debt and equity. The regressions in columns 1 
and 4 of Table 5 show that debt falls strongly but equity does not react significantly to stand-alone 
status. We find a significant reduction in the frequency of debt issuance (coef. -0.3284, t-stat 2.05, in 
column 2), but no effect on debt retirement (column 3). There are insignificant effects on equity 
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issuance and retirement (columns 5 and 6). These results suggest that the reduction in leverage is a 
consequence of the inability of firms to continue borrowing once they become stand-alone. 
The results in Table 5 reduce the scope of potential explanations. For instance, they help to rule 
out a mechanical reduction in leverage caused by the controlling shareholder using the proceeds of 
the sale of the other firm to increase equity in this firm. Moreover, a mechanical reduction in leverage 
of this type does not predict a fall in asset growth. Why, indeed, would a company grow less if the 
controlling shareholder has just increased its investment?9  
Table 5 suggests that the impact of stand-alone status has its origin in credit markets, rather than 
equity markets. The next section, therefore, focuses on linking the results to credit constraints.  
 
3. Mechanisms 
We first study cases where credit constraints are more likely to be binding. We then try to 
pin down the precise mechanism through which business groups alleviate credit constraints. Next, we 
explore firm characteristics that are related to inefficient investment and capital misallocation. We 
draw on the literature on internal capital markets (see Stein, 2003, for a survey), which, although 
focusing on conglomerates, can guide the discussion about capital allocation in groups. Finally, we 
study the average effect of becoming stand-alone on firm performance. 
 
3.1. Credit Constraints 
                                                            
9 See also the results regarding cash holdings in Table 14, which belie a mechanical reduction in leverage if 
the alleged increase in equity is saved as cash. 
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As suggested by the decomposition of leverage in Section 2.2, the inability of stand-alone 
firms to borrow explains their reduction in leverage. One implication of credit constraints is that the 
effect should be particularly strong in industries that are naturally more debt-reliant. Consistent with 
this, Table 6, Panel A shows that our results do indeed come mostly from firms in debt-dependent 
industries. In the leverage regressions, the coefficient on  in the high debt-dependence 
sample is almost three times that for the low debt-dependence sample (-0.1261 vs. -0.0460). Similarly, 
in the asset growth regressions, the coefficient on  is stronger and more statistically 
significant in the high debt-dependence sample (-0.1882 vs. -0.1128). Since the first stage is similarly 
strong in both subsamples, the lack of an effect in the low-dependence sample is not due to a selection 
problem, i.e., not only firms in high-dependence industries are affected by the instrument. We also 
find that low equity-dependence industries, rather than high equity-dependence industries, suffer the 
most. This result serves as a sort of falsification test to relate our results to credit constraints, rather 
than some generic form of external dependence (results split by both external dependence and equity 
dependence are reported in the Appendix, Table A.4).  
Results should also be stronger in less developed credit markets where constraints are more 
binding. In Panel B of Table 6, we split the countries in our sample by the size of their credit market 
as measured by the ratio of domestic credit to GDP. The results, as expected, are stronger in the 
sample of less developed credit markets. The reduction is larger for both leverage (-0.1354 vs. -
0.0436) and asset growth (-0.2230 vs. -0.0752). Fauver, Houston, and Naranjo (2003) argue that 
industrial diversification is more valuable in less developed financial markets. In line with this, we 
find that the loss of business group affiliation and, hence, the loss of diversification in the form of a 
partner in an unrelated industry is more costly in less developed credit markets.10 
                                                            
10 In the Appendix (Table A.5), we also show that our results are stronger in countries with relatively low 
investor protection as measured by the anti-self-dealing index of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008). Hence, our results are related to the development of financial markets as measured by the depth 
of debt markets and the protection of minority shareholders.   
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In Table 7, we look at whether banking relationships are affected by becoming stand-alone. 
In IV regressions, we find that becoming stand-alone has a strong positive effect on both the creation 
and destruction of banking relationships (no effect in OLS). Long-lasting banking relationships relax 
credit constraints since soft information, in particular about small firms like those in our sample, is 
hard to convey to new lenders (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Hence, the evidence of a strong reshuffling 




Following these tests of generic credit constraints, we focus on the precise mechanisms 
through which business groups can relax credit constraints. Their financing advantage can reflect 
cross-pledging between firms. A firm faces less binding credit constraints if leveraging on the assets 
or cash flows of the other firm in the group. From the contractual point of view, this can be achieved 
through collateral cross-pledging, using the assets of one firm as collateral for the debt of the other or 
transferring cash flow between firms through intra-group loans or accounts payable (Ghatak and Kali, 
2001; Hart and Moore, 1998). 
The channel we propose is related to collateral cross-pledging, which disappears as a 
possibility when the firm is standalone, but not when the firm remains in a group. We proxy for 
collateral using tangible assets (e.g., real estate). In Panel A of Table 8, we use the relative tangibility 
of the two firms in the group to divide the sample according to its potential for collateral cross-
pledging. A firm that becomes stand-alone should suffer more in terms of debt capacity and, 
consequently, growth when the other firm added relatively more tangible assets to the group. In a 
sense, it loses the financial “subsidy” it was receiving as part of a group with a high-tangibility 
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partner. We find that our results are stronger, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance, 
in the sample of firms that lose a high-tangibility partner.  
Following Hann, Ogneva, and Ozbas (2013), we test for the effects of cash-flow cross-
pledging using the correlation of cash flows across firms. As the correlation decreases, total cash flow 
in the group should be more stable and financing capacity should increase (see Tirole, 2006, chapter 
4, for a formal model; and Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). A firm that becomes stand-alone should be 
more affected if the partner it loses is a low-correlation partner. In Panel B of Table 8, we divide the 
sample according to the sales correlation of the industries of the firms in the group. We do not find 
evidence of cash-flow cross-pledging. In fact, the decrease in leverage is marginally stronger in the 
high-correlation sample. In Section 4.1.1 on the exclusion restriction, we show more evidence against 
the existence of cash-flow risk-sharing in our setup. 
 
3.3 Misallocation in Business Groups 
Relaxing credit constraints is good if firms underinvest as compared to their first best but can 
be bad if they invest in poor projects that credit markets would otherwise not fund. The prediction for 
our setup is that inefficient firms which are subsidized in groups should be hurt the most when they 
become stand-alone.  
In Table 9, we explore several proxies for being inefficiently subsidized. In Panel A, we 
divide firms using their performance (OROA) relative to industry peers at the beginning of the 
sample. We find that the reduction in leverage occurs mostly in firms with below-peers initial 
performance (coefficient -0.1873, t-stat 1.98). In fact, firms with high performance relative to their 
industry peers see their leverage ratios increase after becoming stand-alone (coefficient 0.0972, t-stat 
1.84). This suggests that high-performing firms can increase leverage once free from the burden of 
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less profitable partners and, consequently, not all firms benefit from belonging to a group. Differences 
in asset growth point in the same direction, but the coefficients are not statistically significant in either 
sample. In Panel B, we divide firms according to their initial leverage relative to industry peers and 
find a larger reduction in leverage among high-leverage firms. One possible interpretation is that 
high-leverage firms received more credit from banks precisely because they were part of a group. We 
do not find significant results for asset growth in these subsamples. 
In Table 9, Panel C, we divide firms according to their characteristics relative to the other 
firm in the group. This is a measure of relative standing within the group, not within the industry as 
in previous panels. Following Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), we use the divergence in Tobin’s 
Q between the industries of both firms in the group to divide the sample. These authors find that the 
degree of subsidization is stronger when the divergence in Tobin’s Q is bigger. Our results point in 
the same direction since the reduction in leverage after becoming stand-alone is larger in those firms 
where the Tobin’s Q of the other firm in the group is higher (-0.1105 vs. -0.0231). Firms with a low 
Q relative to their partners are stronger candidates for receiving subsidized funding when belonging 
to a group and naturally suffer the most when becoming stand-alone. We do not find a similarly strong 
effect on asset growth. When the sample is divided according to the relative OROA of both firms in 
the group (Panel D), the results are stronger in firms that had a high OROA partner, which is again 
consistent with misallocation in groups. However, the results in this sample are not statistically 
significant, due partly to the smaller sample size. 
 
3.4 Average Effect on Performance 
The theoretical literature does not give a strong prior regarding the average effect of 
becoming stand-alone on performance. This is because of the interplay of the costs and benefits of 
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business groups. By becoming stand-alone, a firm may lose access to financing but may also gain 
focus and cut value-destroying investments.  
In private firms, we can only rely on profitability as a measure of performance (Bennedsen, 
Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon, 2007). Table 10, Panel A shows that becoming stand-alone 
does not have a statistically significant effect on OROA.  The first stage is as strong as in our main 
results for leverage and asset growth so this lack of significance cannot be attributed to weak 
instruments. It is true that the OROA sample is smaller than our main sample since OROA is missing 
in many cases but, given the theoretical ambiguity, it is not surprising that we do not find a strong 
effect on performance. We find similar results for sales over assets as an alternative measure of 
performance (Panel B). 
The overall insignificant effect on performance can also serve as a reality check in the style 
suggested by Jiang (2017). A strong effect on performance would raise the question of why firms stay 
affiliated to groups if so much value can be created by splitting. The negligible average effect on 
performance suggests an equilibrium where there are both affiliated and unaffiliated firms. 
 
 
4. Additional Results 
 
4.1 Examination of IV assumptions 
Our empirical design combines differences-in-differences with instrumental variables. Figure 
5 shows that the parallel trends assumption of differences-in-differences holds for treated and control 
firms, prior to treated firms becoming stand-alone. We now explore the assumptions behind the 
instrumental variables design in more detail. 




4.1.1 Exclusion restriction 
 The exclusion restriction means that  does not belong to the second stage 
equation on its own merit, or in other words, that the entire effect of  is channeled 
through the stand-alone status of the firm. Ultimately, the exclusion restriction cannot be tested since 
the regression of firm outcomes on  is also the reduced-form version of our results. 
However, we do find suggestive evidence that  does not have a direct effect on firms’ 
outcomes, at least in our sample.  
A theoretical threat to the exclusion restriction would be the presence of active cash-flow 
risk-sharing between group firms, which was already studied using the sales correlations shown in 
Table 8. In this case, cash flows are transferred from one firm to another, for example through intra-
group loans, in order to smooth transitory shocks. Consistent with this type of risk-sharing, Lamont 
(1997) shows that non-oil segments of big oil conglomerates reduce investment in response to 
negative oil shocks. In terms of our regression setup, shocks to the oil industry (the “other” industry 
in Lamont’s example) would enter the second stage regression of non-oil firms even if they remain 
affiliated to the conglomerate or group. 
We further examine this hypothesis in several ways. First, we examine the behavior only of 
control firms. If  has a direct effect on firms’ outcomes, other than through changes in 
business group affiliation, effects should also be seen in firms that remain in a group. In particular, 
those firms that are hit by a shock to the other firm in the group should display differences in growth 
and leverage when compared to firms where there was not a shock to the other firm. Instead, Figure 
5 shows that leverage is very similar across control firms regardless of whether there was a shock to 
the other firm in the group. The difference is not statistically significant. By the same token, 
differences in asset growth for years t=1 and t=3 are not significant between the two types of control 
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firms. In year t=2, firms where there was a shock to the other firm have higher growth, rather than 
the lower growth predicted by the cash-flow risk-sharing hypothesis. Albeit transitory, this effect 
should, if anything, bias the results against our main finding. Our conclusion from Figure 5 is that 
shocks to the other firm do not have a relevant effect on firms that remain in a group, which supports 
the exclusion restriction.  
Intra-group loans are often hard to identify in the data, sometimes because regulatory 
disclosure requirements are lax. However, they are typically included in the borrowing firm’s balance 
sheet in items such as “other debt” or “other accounts payable” and in that of the lending firm in 
“other assets” or “other accounts receivable”. The literature uses these entries as proxies for intra-
group loans (Jiang, Lee, and Yue, 2010). If there is active borrowing and lending between group firms 
in response to shocks, “other debt” should increase in response to own shocks as the firm borrows 
from the partner firm and “other assets” should increase in response to shocks in the other firm as it 
lends to the partner firm. This possibility is examined in Table 11 (Panel A), again within the sample 
of control firms. We use the ratios of “other current debt”, “other non-current debt” and “other current 
assets” to total assets as dependent variables and find no association between these types of debt or 
assets and our shocks, which again supports the exclusion restriction.  
As a second test, we look at what we call the “early sample”, which includes treated firms 
before they become stand-alone and their matched control firms for the same years. The entire sample 
period for each firm cannot be used because, in that case, the test would reflect the reduced-form 
version of the IV results. We focus exclusively on years t-1 and earlier (where year t is the year the 
firm becomes stand-alone). This early sample allows us to test the idea that firms react to shocks by 
borrowing and lending among themselves or by selling assets to each other, before becoming stand-
alone. If this is the case, shocks propagate through several mechanisms of which becoming stand-
alone is only the most drastic.  
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Table 11 (Panel B) shows the results of regressions with the early sample using as explanatory 
variables  and the interaction of   and a dummy variable for the firms 
that eventually become stand-alone. We find that  has no explanatory power in any of 
the regressions (for “other current debt,” “other non-current debt” and “other current assets”) and the 
interaction with the treated dummy is also insignificant. This suggests that firms do not borrow from 
their partners in anticipation of becoming stand-alone.   
There are at least three possible explanations for the absence of a direct impact of shocks 
other than through stand-alone status. First, the shocks we study are relatively large profitability 
shocks, representing long-lasting changes in an industry’s economic outlook. It is not obvious that 
firms would find it optimal to smooth these shocks or have the capacity to do so only with the help 
of the other (small) firm in the group. The response to transitory liquidity shocks, which have an 
impact at a much higher frequency, or to smaller shocks relative to firm size could be different. 
Second, as argued by Whited (2001), the effect of other-firm cash flow that has been documented in 
earlier studies is often contaminated with measurement error and by the relatedness of firms. At least 
in our sample we exclude, by construction, firms in related industries so it is perhaps not too surprising 
that we do not find a direct impact of shocks. Finally, the previous literature on cash-flow risk-sharing 
deals mostly with conglomerates of fully-owned divisions (e.g., Lamont, 1997). It is contractually 
harder to transfer cash flows between independent corporations in business groups, which are subject 
to the limits often imposed by regulation, covenants, and bank monitoring.  
Besides cash-flow risk-sharing there are demand-side mechanisms that could violate the 
exclusion restriction. In particular, demand spillovers can make the shocks to the other firm matter 
for the firm under study. For example, think of a group with one firm in construction and another firm 
in the food industry. Although production in the two firms is not integrated, a negative shock to 
construction (e.g., a housing bust) can also affect the food industry through the wealth effect of 
housing on consumption. The shock to construction could, therefore, enter the second stage regression 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2777552 
28 
 
of the food producer, regardless of its stand-alone status. Although demand spillovers are hard to 
measure because they involve cross-industry effects, we argue that they should be stronger in 
industries with a high income elasticity. For example, if the second firm in the group produces a 
durable good (e.g., cars) rather than food, then it should be more affected by the construction shock.  
In order to test this idea, we divide the sample based on whether firms produce durable goods 
or not, which we use as a proxy for high income elasticity.11 If our results are explained by demand 
spillovers, they should be concentrated in industries with high elasticity such as car manufacturing. 
As seen in Table 12 Panel A, the effect of becoming stand-alone is not stronger among firms in high 
elasticity industries, which speaks against the idea of demand spillovers. This can also be expected 
because the housing crisis, arguably the largest source of income effects, accounts for only a small 
subset of our shocks.12  
A second possibility is that demand in a geographical area is affected by industrial shocks, 
which could be particularly relevant for firms in services. Similarly, banks in an area can be affected 
by the poor performance of a given industry, consequently affecting other industries in the area by 
restricting the supply of funds. We address this by forming two samples depending on whether both 
firms in the business group are located in the same city or not. As seen in Table 12, Panel B, 
coefficients in groups with both firms in the same city are similar to those in groups with firms in 
different cities. 
Overall, our results suggest that the exclusion restriction is not violated by cash-flow risk 
sharing between firms or by demand spillovers.  
                                                            
11 High elasticity industries include construction (SIC 15-17), manufacturing of durable goods (SIC 24-25, 32-
38), wholesale trade in durable goods (SIC 50), retail trade in durable goods (SIC 52, 55, and 57) and real estate 
(SIC 65).  
12 The housing crisis –decline in construction and real estate— that affected Europe during this period 
propagated to seven four-digit SIC codes, representing 21 SIC-year shocks out of the 359 shocks in Table A.1. 





One important concern with the implementation of IV strategies is the “as if” random 
assignment between treated and control groups (Atanasov and Black, 2016). In line with covariate 
common support, the treated and the matched control firms appear to be very similar in several 
dimensions before treatment (Table 2, Figures 3 and 5, and the more formal analysis in Table A.6, 
Panel A, of the Appendix).  
A subtler concern is that, while our sample may display covariate balance for the treatment 
assignment in the second stage regression, it may not be balanced regarding the assignment of the 
instrument in the first stage. In other words, it is possible that firms affected by the instrument are 
different from those not affected by it. We examine this possibility by comparing firms’ 
characteristics prior to receiving the “other shock” (and, for the treated firms, also prior to becoming 
stand-alone). The main variables are not on average significantly different across these firms (Table 
A.6, Panel B). The only marginally significant difference (at the 6% level) is that firms with partners 
that receive shocks have fewer assets. A common remedy for an imbalance of this type is to trim the 
sample to have common support. In fact, if we drop the very small firms (assets of less than 100,000 
euros), we obtain covariate balance in all variables including assets (Table A.6, Panel C). For the 
sample of firms with assets above 100,000 euros, we repeat the IV regressions and find estimates 
very similar to the ones obtained with main sample (Table A.7). This suggests that the small 
differences in asset size according to the instrument are inconsequential for our findings.  
Regarding this concern for balance, we also explore an alternative matching procedure. We 
first select firms that have a partner in the group with a shock. We then match those firms to other 
firms with partners that do not receive shocks. In simple, we match on the instrument instead of the 
treatment. The resulting sample is 40% larger than with our preferred method but has fewer firms 
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moving to stand-alone status and fewer “compliers” (firms that are induced to become stand-alone 
because of shocks to their partner). In unreported results, we find that the  is still 
significant at the 1% level in the first stage, but the first stage is in general weaker: the magnitude of 
the effect and the R-squared are smaller than with our main method. In the second stage, the 
coefficients are very similar, implying that matching based on the instrument or treatment is 
inconsequential for our main finding. However, when we match based on the instrument the statistical 
significance is lower, so our method, because of the higher fraction of compliers, has more power. 
Our method also gives a more balanced sample in terms of covariates. 
A final way to assess the “as if” random assignment is to run an “intent-to-treat” differences-
in-differences (DiD). The intent-to-treat DiD gives the average effect of the shock for all firms, while 
the IV gives the effect for compliers alone. Results for the intent-to-treat DiD are in line with what 
would be expected (Table A.8). The DiD coefficient for the other shock variable is approximately a 
tenth of the IV coefficient for stand-alone, which makes sense since the probability of treatment given 
these shocks is about 10% as seen in the first stage (Table 3). The DiD results are significant at least 
at the 5% level. Importantly, these results are robust to the inclusion of additional covariates, which 
is indicative of quasi-randomly assigned instruments (Atanasov and Black, 2017).  
 
4.1.3 The magnitude of IV coefficients 
The magnitude of IV coefficients, in particular in relation to OLS coefficients, is a potential 
warning sign of violations of IV assumptions. Jiang (2017) shows that most studies in her survey 
report IV estimates that are larger than OLS estimates, even if there is no a priori reason to expect a 
bias in that direction. Our results in Table 4 fall into the category of larger-IV-than-OLS estimates. 
However, as explained above, we expect endogeneity to dampen the effects of stand-alone status in 
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OLS since firms that leave a group are endogenously more likely to gain little from business group 
affiliation.  
Even if there are good reasons to expect the IV estimates to be larger than the OLS estimates, 
another concern is that the former may not be representative of the entire population. This is because 
they only reveal a local average treatment effect (LATE), not the true population average treatment 
effect (ATE). In our case, the IV estimates represent the effect of becoming stand-alone on compliers. 
Non-compliers, i.e., firms that remain in groups despite the industrial shocks to their partner, fail to 
respond to the instrument potentially because the benefits of group affiliation are too large. Since 
compliers are likely to be firms with smaller gains from business group affiliation, we expect the 
LATE to be smaller than the true ATE. Hence, it is unlikely that the significant changes in leverage 
and asset growth we find are the result of our IV results overestimating the true population effects.  
 
4.1.4 External Validity 
Most of the literature on business groups studies large groups with multiple listed firms (e.g., 
Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). The groups that we study, instead, are small groups with private firms. 
Focusing on small groups facilitates identification of causal effects. However, precisely because our 
setup is not typical of previous work, it raises the problem of external validity. 
Small groups can shed light on the behavior of more complex groups since the underlying trade-
offs are analogous in both cases. The agency problem between an owner and creditors, which 
produces credit constraints, is still present in our sample. The groups in our sample are also 
industrially diversified like the majority of large groups (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).  
Our sample has three main differences with respect to other samples studied in the literature.  
First, some of the agency problems of listed firms are not present in our sample of private firms. For 
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example, we cannot study tunneling, which is a concern in groups with many listed firms and low 
ownership concentration. The very high controlling stakes of our sample (above 95%) mean there is 
little incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. However, although ownership is not dispersed, 
there is still the possibility of capital misallocation because of owner preferences (i.e., pet projects).  
Second, the large groups studied in other papers have the additional complication of general 
equilibrium effects. Business groups often represent non-trivial parts of the economy and, with their 
market power, influence the price of goods and capital (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006b; Morck, 
Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005). The absence of general equilibrium effects means that our setting of 
small groups provides cleaner estimates of the effects of business group affiliation. 
Third, because our sample period (2009-13) coincides with that of recovery from the 2008-9 
financial crisis, it may not be fully representative of distressed conditions. However it does include 
episodes of negative GDP growth experienced by some European countries due to the 2011-12 
banking crisis (e.g., Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal).  
 
4.2 Alternative Hypotheses 
Finally, we explore several alternative hypotheses where groups matter, but not because of 
their ability to raise more funds by cross-pledging collateral.  
A first alternative hypothesis relates to the loss of owner’s wealth produced by our shocks 
due to the decrease in the equity value of the affected firm. Wealthier owners can raise more on 
financial markets than their less wealthy equivalents, even if the firm being studied is not directly 
affected by the shock (Tirole, 2006). Hence, the wealth channel could explain the capital structure 
effects we find.  
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One problem with the wealth interpretation is that the effects we find are specific to firms 
that become stand-alone. Similar firms that remain in a business group also face shocks to the other 
firm in the group and their owners also suffer wealth losses, but they do not experience the same 
reductions in leverage and asset growth as firms that become stand-alone (Figure 5).  
The lack of an effect of owner’s wealth on firms that remain in a group is perfectly consistent 
with a collateral channel. When a firm becomes stand-alone, the assets of the other firm are no longer 
pledgeable whereas a firm that remains in a group can still use the other firm’s assets as collateral 
even if its equity value has decreased. The value of collateral (e.g., real estate) is, moreover, smoother 
than equity values and is not necessarily affected by equity shocks.13 For example, a shock to the 
price of milk, although affecting a dairy farm’s cash flows, is not immediately translated into a shock 
to the value of its land. If collateral is not affected, then the debt capacity of the firm (under the 
collateral cross-pledging hypothesis) stays relatively constant despite the shock to the owner’s wealth. 
Moreover, loans are often over-collateralized and fluctuations in the value of collateral, even if they 
occur, do not typically lead to debt renegotiation. 
In Table 13, we attempt to distinguish between the effects of collateral and wealth. We cannot 
directly compute the loss of owner’s wealth since we cannot observe the market value of equity in 
private firms. However, we suggest that the size of the wealth loss is related to the ratio of the book 
value of the other firm’s equity to the sum of the book value of both firms’ equity. Since tangible 
assets and equity values are related by accounting identities, this ratio is correlated to the ratio of 
tangible assets used in Table 8 as a proxy for the size of the collateral loss. Therefore, we use the 
difference between the equity ratio and the tangibility ratio to distinguish between the two 
                                                            
13 We also find empirical evidence that our shocks are not correlated with collateral value. From Eurostat, we 
collect data on house prices at the country level as a proxy for real estate values. We find an insignificant 
correlation of yearly growth rates in house prices and the frequency of shocks by country. Countries with worse 
housing market crises during this period (e.g., Ireland, Italy or Spain) do not show a higher frequency of our 
shocks. 
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mechanisms. A positive difference implies that the wealth loss is stronger than the collateral loss 
while a negative difference implies the opposite. As seen in Table 13, the effect on leverage is 
concentrated in firms with a strong collateral loss, rather than in firms whose owners suffered a strong 
equity loss. Overall, the evidence supports the collateral interpretation and not the wealth 
interpretation. 
A second alternative hypothesis concerns the controlling shareholder’s risk tolerance. After 
a negative shock, owners whose wealth has decreased may decide to reduce risk by cutting leverage 
and asset growth. We analyze this possibility in two ways in Table 14. First, in Panel A we run 
regressions with the ratio of cash holdings to assets as the dependent variable. The IV coefficient for 
stand-alone firms is negative (-0.0643) and significant at the 10% level. Therefore, if anything, there 
is evidence of reduced cash holdings as opposed to the cash hoarding predicted by the risk tolerance 
hypothesis. A second approach is to divide our sample into subsamples with different levels of 
industrial volatility. If the reduction in leverage and asset growth is explained by lower risk tolerance, 
then our results should be stronger among firms in more volatile industries. Instead, as shown in Table 
14, Panel B, they are concentrated in less volatile industries.  
Finally, taxes can be a powerful incentive to form business groups. In particular, the losses 
of one firm can reduce the tax burden of the controlling shareholder by helping to offset the other 
firm’s earnings. This could explain the fall in asset growth after firms become stand-alone because 
the incentives to invest are dampened. Taxes should be more relevant for pairs of firms with low cash-
flow correlations because they are particularly well placed to take advantage of the tax shield provided 
by each other’s losses. However, when sorting firms according to cash-flow correlations (Table 8), 
we do not find strong differences. The point estimate of the effect of becoming stand-alone on asset 
growth is even stronger in the high correlation sample, in contrast to what the tax hypothesis would 
suggest.   






We estimate the causal effect of business group affiliation using a sample of groups composed 
of only two firms in 2009-2013. Some of these groups split up during this time, leaving firms as 
stand-alones. We instrument for stand-alone status using shocks to the industry of the other firm in 
the group. In order to make the identification strategy cleaner, we look at groups that have firms in 
unrelated industries since the industrial shock to the other firm could otherwise affect the firm of 
interest and violate the exclusion restriction in an instrumental variables setting.  
We find that firms that become stand-alone reduce leverage and asset growth.  This is 
consistent with the idea that affiliation to a group eases credit constraints. The effects are more 
pronounced when the other firm has high tangibility, which is consistent with collateral cross-
pledging, and when the firm operates in a debt-dependent industry or a country with low domestic 
credit. In line with misallocation in business groups, the firms more affected by becoming stand-alone 
are those with a poor previous performance and high leverage relative to their industry peers, and 
those with a low industry Tobin’s Q relative to the other firm in the group. Our results underscore the 
important consequences of affiliation to a business group for financing and investment policies.  
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Note: There may, or may not be shocks to industry i (seen in the figure) and to industry k (not seen in the figure). These are “other shocks” in equation (1), and 
they represent the instrument in the first stage regression: . Shocks to industry k help 
improve the first stage estimation. There may, or may not be shocks to industry j (not seen in the figure), for treated firms (firm 2 in the figure) and control firms
(firm 3 in the figure). These shocks are “own shocks” which have a direct effect on the second stage regression— equation (2): 	
	  — and as a consequence they are also included in the first stage regression (equation 1)  
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Figure 2: Examples of Industrial Shocks  
This figure shows the evolution of returns for firms in Europe in two industries (continuous line) and the time 
of an exogenous event (long-dash line) that affected those industries. Returns are computed as 6-month rolling 
window weighted averages of firms’ returns in the industry. Panel A shows the evolution of returns for the 
Games and Toys industry. The event is a toy safety regulation enacted by the European Commission in June 
2009. Panel B shows the evolution of returns for the Prepared Meets industry. The event is a twelve-month 
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Figure 3: Size densities of treated and control firms 
This figure shows the kernel distribution of assets for two set of firms: Firms that belonged to a two-firm 
business group during the whole sample period (control firms); and firms that belonged to a two-firm business 
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Figure 4: Pairwise distribution of firms’ industries 
This figure shows the distribution of firms belonging to two-firm business groups in unrelated industries, 
according to their three-digit sic code and the three-digit sic code of its companion firm. Triangles represent 
firms whose companion firm did not receive an industrial shock. Crosses represent firms whose companion 
firm did receive an industrial shock. The size of the symbols indicates the number of firms in any given 
SIC/other-SIC coordinate. Smaller symbols represent a single firm; mid-sized symbols represent a two-five 
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Figure 5: Event study 
This figure shows the evolution of leverage (Panel A) and Asset Growth (Panel B) for firms the sample. For 
each treated firm we define event years relative to stand-alone status (t=0 is the year in which treated firms 
become stand-alone). We use a matched control for each treated firm, so we are also able to graph the evolution 
of control firms relative to the years to becoming stand-alone of treated firms. We differentiate between treated 
firms that face shocks to the other firm before they split (before t=0) and treated firms that do not. Similarly, 
we differentiate between control firms that face shocks to the other firm (before time 0) and control firms that 
do not. To emulate within firm differences, we compute the average change in firm leverage (asset growth) 
between event years for each group, and compute the average. We use as starting point the average of firms’ 
first leverage (asset growth) observation in the sample. In Panel B we start from t=-1, rather than t=-2, as asset 
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Table 1: Sample description 
This table displays the distribution of observations in our sample for treated firms (firms that eventually become 
stand-alone) and control firms (firms that remain as two-firm business groups). The upper part of the table 
displays the distribution of observations by years; the middle part displays observations by country; and the 
lower part by two-digit SIC codes. 
Treated firms Control firms

















United Kingdom 1,266 504
Total 16,105 15,762
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for our sample. Panel A describes observations for firms that eventually 
become stand-alone (treated) and Panel B describes observations for firms that always remain as part of a two-
firm business group (control firms). Firm-level characteristics include firms’ financials and ownership. 
Leverage is book value of debt over assets. Assets is measured in millions of euros. Assets growth is the 
difference between firms’ logarithm of assets and its lag.  Tangibility is PP&E over assets. Cash is cash holdings 
over assets. Tobin’s Q is computed as the mean market to book ratio of all publicly traded firms’ in Europe 
under the same three-digit SIC code. Sales/Assets is the ratio of annual sales divided by assets. OROA is EBIT 
divided by assets. Stand-alone takes a value of 1 for observations of firms that operate in a year as stand-alone, 
and 0 if they are part of a two-firm business group. Debt and Equity are measured in millions of euros. Debt 
and equity issue (retirement) take a value of 1 if their yearly change relative to lagged assets is greater than 5% 
(less than -5%), and 0 otherwise. Stake is the controller’s ownership stake in the firm. Own Shock takes a value 
of 1 if a firm operates in a year and industry were we identify an industrial shock, and for the next two years, 
and zero otherwise. Other Shock takes a value of 1 if the companion firm in a firm’s business group operates 
in a year and industry were we identify an industrial shock, and for the next two years, and zero otherwise. 
Relative Tangibility is the average PP&E of the companion firm across sample years divided by the average 
PP&E of the focal firm across sample years. Sales correlation represents the correlation coefficient between a 
firm’s industry and the companion firm’s industry sales. We use U.S. sales data to compute this measure. 
Relative Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the companion firm’s industry Tobin’s Q and the focal firm’s industry Tobin’s 
Q. Relative OROA is the OROA of the companion firm divided by the OROA of the focal firm. Wealth-
collateral exposure is Eother/(Eown+Eother)- Tother/(Town+Tother), where E stands for the dollar amount of book equity 
and T for the dollar amount of tangible assets (PP&E). Domestic credit represents the ratio of domestic credit 
to private institutions divided by a country’s GDP, for firms operating in those countries. Industry Financial 
Dependence and Equity Financial Dependence are Rajan and Zingales (1998) measures of external financial 
dependence, computed at the three-digit sic-code using US data. Industry Debt Dependence derives from Rajan 
and Zingales as well: For each firm in the U.S. we subtract the measure of equity dependence to overall financial 
dependence, and then aggregate at the industry level. Creating New Banking Relations takes a value of 1 if a 
firm in a year establish a relation with a new bank, and 0 otherwise.  Destroying Banking Relations takes a 
value of 1 if a firm in a year discontinues a relation with a bank, and 0 otherwise.   
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Panel A: Eventually stand-alone firms
Variable Mean Median SD N
Firm characteristics Leverage 0.59 0.64 0.30 13,939
Assets (million) 1.51 0.68 1.86 16,105
Asset Growth 0.02 0.00 0.24 12,671
Tangibility 0.28 0.16 0.29 15,211
Cash 0.16 0.08 0.21 15,098
Tobin's Q (industry) 2.97 2.71 1.48 16,105
Sales/Assets 1.84 1.42 1.71 9,495
OROA 0.05 0.04 0.14 6,437
Stand-alone 0.57 1.00 0.49 16,105
Debt (million) 0.97 0.40 1.32 13,939
Debt issue 0.30 0.00 0.46 10,097
Debt retirement 0.30 0.00 0.46 10,097
Equity (million) 0.61 0.19 1.02 13,939
Equity issue 0.29 0.00 0.46 10,097
Equity retirment 0.15 0.00 0.36 10,097
Stake 95.30 100 14.38 16,105
Shocks Own Shock 0.23 0.00 0.42 16,105
Other Shock 0.22 0.00 0.41 16,105
Relative-to-pair Relative Tangibility (other/own) 6.65 0.15 82.2 15,537
characteristics Sales Correlation 0.54 0.74 0.46 16,105
Relative Tobin's Q (other/own) 1.39 1.03 1.85 16,105
Relative OROA (other/own) 1.10 1.04 0.53 6,654
Wealth-collateral exposure -0.02 0.00 0.30 13,533
External financing Domestic Credit/GDP 1.29 1.13 0.38 14,318
characteristics Industry Fin. Dep. (R&Z) 0.85 1.00 0.39 16,105
Industry Equity Dep. (R&Z) 0.31 0.07 0.54 16,105
Industry Debt Dep. (R&Z) 0.15 0.35 0.86 16,105
Creating New Bank Rel. 0.11 0.00 0.32 16,105
Destroying Existing Bank Rel. 0.10 0.00 0.29 16,105
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Panel B: Always business group firms
Variable Mean Median SD N
Firm characteristics Leverage 0.59 0.65 0.30 13,680
Assets (million) 1.51 0.68 1.87 15,762
Asset Growth 0.02 0.00 0.23 12,358
Tangibility 0.27 0.15 0.30 14,782
Cash 0.16 0.08 0.20 14,734
Tobin's Q (industry) 2.93 2.67 1.45 15,762
Sales/Assets 1.83 1.38 1.74 9,345
OROA 0.05 0.04 0.15 6,722
Stand-alone 0 0 0 15,762
Debt (million) 1.00 0.41 1.37 13,680
Debt issue 0.30 0.00 0.46 9,932
Debt retirement 0.30 0.00 0.46 9,932
Equity (million) 0.58 0.18 0.98 13,680
Equity issue 0.28 0.00 0.45 9,932
Equity retirment 0.14 0.00 0.35 9,932
Stake 98.62 100 6.74 15,762
Shocks Own Shock 0.26 0.00 0.44 15,762
Other Shock 0.23 0.00 0.42 15,762
Relative-to-pair Relative Tangibility (other/own) 6.83 0.30 53.4 15,033
characteristics Sales Correlation 0.53 0.73 0.46 15,762
Relative Tobin's Q (other/own) 1.39 1.02 1.89 15,762
Relative OROA (other/own) 1.14 1.07 0.52 7,155
Wealth-collateral exposure -0.03 -0.01 0.30 13,704
External financing Domestic Credit/GDP 1.26 1.13 0.35 14,298
characteristics Industry Fin. Dep. (R&Z) 0.84 1.00 0.39 15,762
Industry Equity Dep. (R&Z) 0.30 0.08 0.55 15,762
Industry Debt Dep. (R&Z) 0.15 0.31 0.86 15,762
Creating New Bank Rel. 0.10 0.00 0.31 15,762
Destroying Existing Bank Rel. 0.09 0.00 0.29 15,762




Table 3: First stage regressions 
Columns 1-3 present results for the first stage regressions of the leverage (second stage) equation. All columns present 
the coefficients of Other Shock (the instrument) and Own Shock (control variable). The columns differ in the number 
of observations and controls included. The specifications in cols. 1 and 3 do not have any additional controls besides 
firm and year fixed effects. The results from col 1. differ from those in col. 2, in that in the later we restrict the sample 
to that available when including the additional controls used in col. 3. Controls used in col. 3 include the firms’ 
industry Tobin’s Q, lagged Tangibility and lagged logarithm of assets. Standard errors are adjusted by 
heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-country level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
First Stage - Leverage Regressions Sample
Variable Stand-alone Stand-alone Stand-alone
Other Shock 0.0889*** 0.1120*** 0.1118***
(0.0122) (0.0162) (0.0162)
Own Shock 0.0902*** 0.1284*** 0.1285***
(0.0213) (0.0203) (0.0203)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes
Sample restr. to  controls 
data
No Yes Yes
Craig-Donald Wald F 83.18 83.46 83.17
R-squared (whithin) 0.3905 0.317 0.317





























Table 4: Second stage regressions 
Panel A presents the second stage (IV) estimates of stand-alone, instrumented with Other Shock. Cols 1-3 show results 
using leverage as dependent variable, while columns 4-6 display results using asset growth as dependent variable. All 
specifications include as control the variable Own Shock. Specifications differ in the additional controls included and 
whether the data is restricted to that available for the additional controls — even if they are not included. Panel B 
present the OLS estimates for the same dependent variables, treating stand-alone as an exogenous variable. Standard 
errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-country level. Significant at the *10%, 
**5%, ***1%. 
 
Panel A- Second Stage IV Estimations
Variable Leverage Leverage Leverage Asset Growth Asset Growth Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.1034** -0.0866** -0.0884** -0.2239** -0.2136*** -0.1562**
(0.0490) (0.0418) (0.0420) (0.0957) (0.0811) (0.0729)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Sample restr. to  
controls data
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 27210 19150 19150 24904 22385 22385  
Panel B- OLS Estimations
Variable Leverage Leverage Leverage Asset Growth Asset Growth Asset Growth
Stand-alone 0.0029 0.0023 0.0022 -0.0017 0.0006 0.0024
(0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0060) (0.0069) (0.0054)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Sample restr. to  
controls data
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes



















Table 5: Decomposing the effect on leverage 
Panel A presents the second stage (IV) estimates of stand-alone, instrumented with Other Shock. Different measures 
of debt and equity are used as dependent variables. All specifications include as control the variable Own Shock, and 
the additional controls used in Table 4. Panel B present the OLS estimates for the same dependent variables, treating 
stand-alone as an exogenous variable. Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-
digit) sic-by-country level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
Panel A- Second Stage IV Estimations
Variable log(debt) Debt issue Debt ret. log(equity) Equity issue Equity ret.
Stand-alone -0.4492** -0.3284** 0.1157 0.1037 -0.1054 -0.0851
(0.1754) (0.1599) (0.1562) (0.1831) (0.1635) (0.1248)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 19150 18469 18469 19150 18469 18469
 
Panel B- OLS Estimations
Variable log(debt) Debt issue Debt ret. log(equity) Equity issue Equity ret.
Stand-alone 0.0067 0.0037 -0.0012 -0.0123 -0.0007 -0.0058
(0.0137) (0.0125) (0.0132) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0098)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes


























Table 6: Mechanisms – credit constraints 
Panels A-B present second stage (IV) estimates of stand-alone for different sample splits. In Panel A we split the 
sample using above and below the median Industry Debt Dependence, derived from Rajan and Zingales (1998) and 
computed using industrial U.S. data. In Panel B we split the sample using above and below the median Domestic 
Credit to GDP from the country where the firm operates. In the bottom of each estimation we present the coefficient 
of the instrument, Other Shock, in the first stage regression. Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and 
clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-country level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
Panel A -Sample Split by Industry Debt Dep. (R&Z)
Low Debt Dependence High Debt Dependence
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset GrowthStandalone
Stand-alone -0.0460 -0.1128 -0.1261** -0.1882**
(0.0556) (0.1107) (0.0639) (0.0957)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9468 10889 9682 11496
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1015*** 0.0912*** 0.1223*** 0.1174***
(0.0222) (0.0188) (0.0228) (0.0223)
Panel B -Sample Split by Domestic Credit/GDP
Low Domestic Credit/GDP High Domestic Credit/GDP
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.1354** -0.2230** -0.0436 -0.0752
(0.0594) (0.0953) (0.0685) (0.1250)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10115 11778 9035 10607
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.0975*** 0.0982*** 0.1203*** 0.0993***















Table 7: Creation and destruction of banking relationships 
This table presents the second stage (IV) and OLS estimates of stand-alone, on banking relation variables. The dummy 
Creating New Relation takes a value of 1 if a firm in a year starts a banking relation with a new bank, and 0 otherwise. 
The dummy Destroying Existing Relation takes a value of 1 if a firm in a year stops dealing with a bank with which 
it had an existing relation, and 0 otherwise. In the bottom of the first two columns we present the coefficient of the 
instrument, Other Shock, in the first stage regressions. Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters 
at the (three-digit) sic-by-country level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
Banking Relations
                 Second Stage IV                       OLS 
Creating Destroying Creating Destroying
Variable New Relation Existing Relation New Relation Existing Relation
Stand-alone 0.3134*** 0.3324*** 0.0113 0.0052
(0.1195) (0.1182) (0.0101) (0.0091)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 22385 22385 22441 22441
First-Stage





























Table 8: Mechanisms – cross pledging 
Panels A-B present second stage (IV) estimates of stand-alone for different sample splits. In Panel A we split the 
sample using above and below the median Relative Tangibility. In Panel B we split the sample using above and below 
the median Sales Correlation. In the bottom of each estimation we present the coefficient of the instrument, Other 
Shock, in the first stage regression. Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) 
sic-by-country level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Panel A -Sample Split by Relative Tangibility (other/own)
Low Tangibility Other Firm High Tangibility Other Firm
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone 0.0036 -0.0461 -0.2627** -0.4045**
(0.0496) (0.0774) (0.1077) (0.2027)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9865 11301 9283 11082
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1418*** 0.1385*** 0.0715*** 0.0627***
(0.0250) (0.0222) (0.0190) (0.0174)
Panel B -Sample Split by Sales Correlation
Low Sales Correlation High Sales Correlation
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.0470 -0.1458* -0.1570* -0.2454
(0.0422) (0.0763) (0.0939) (0.1782)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9764 11407 9386 10978
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1278*** 0.1276*** 0.1024*** 0.0882***















Table 9: Capital misallocation 
Panels A-D present second stage (IV) estimates of stand-alone, instrumented with Other Shock for different sample 
splits. Panels A and B split the sample according to relative-to-peers firms’ initial characteristics. In Panel A we split 
the sample using above and below the median relative-to-peers OROA.  In Panel B we split the sample using above 
and below the median relative-to-peers Leverage. To construct firms’ relative to peers measures we keep firms’ initial 
observation in the sample and run OROA and Leverage regressions using two-digit sic code dummies as explanatory 
variables. From the regressions we obtain the standardized residuals and we use these to order firms in terms of their 
relative-to-peers Leverage and OROA. In Panels C and D we split the sample according to firms’ relative standing 
within their group. In Panel C we split the sample using above and below the median Relative Tobins’ Q. In Panel D 
we split the sample using above and below the median Relative OROA. In the bottom of each estimation we present 
the coefficient of the instrument, Other Shock, in the first stage regression. Standard errors are adjusted by 
heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-country level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
Panel A
Sample Split by Relative to Industry Peers Initial Performance (OROA)
Low Initial OROA High Initial OROA
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.1873** -0.1079 0.0972* 0.0895
(0.0947) (0.1210) (0.0528) (0.1098)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3911 4708 4385 4719
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1436*** 0.1417*** 0.1884*** 0.1802***
(0.0372) (0.0318) (0.0311) (0.0303)
Panel B
Sample Split by Relative to Industry Peers Initial Leverage
Low Initial Leverage High Initial Leverage
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone 0.0098 -0.1169 -0.1996** -0.1079
(0.0551) (0.0773) (0.0822) (0.1305)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9192 9345 9134 9989
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1217*** 0.1229*** 0.0978*** 0.0996***














Sample Split by Relative Tobin's Q (other/own)
Low Relative Other Tobin's Q High Relative Other Tobin's Q 
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.0231 -0.1014 -0.1105** -0.1050
(0.0634) (0.1128) (0.0521) (0.0773)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9032 10457 9127 10805
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1007*** 0.0929*** 0.1488*** 0.1398***
(0.0206) (0.0193) (0.0233) (0.0213)
Panel D
Sample Split by Relative OROA (other/own)
Low Relative Other OROA High Relative Other OROA 
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone 0.0054 0.1213 -0.0474 -0.2484
(0.0593) (0.1091) (0.0938) (0.1576)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4518 4937 4246 5071
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1729*** 0.1643*** 0.1231*** 0.1155***
























Table 10: Performance effects of becoming standalone 
This table examines firms’ performance (OROA in Panel A, and Sales over assets in Panel B). Col. 1 presents the 
second stage (IV) estimates of stand-alone, instrumented with Other Shock. Col. 2 presents the OLS estimate. In the 
bottom of col. 1 we present the coefficient of the instrument, Other Shock, in the first stage regression. Standard errors 
are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-country level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, 
***1%. 
 
Panel A: Performance (OROA)




Own Shock Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes





Panel B: Performance (Sales over assets)




Own Shock Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes




















Table 11: Testing for possible violations of the exclusion restriction 
In this table we present regressions studying the direct effect of shocks on three dependent variables: Other current 
debt over assets, other non-current debt over assets, and other current liabilities over assets. Panel A considers only 
the control sample. Panel B considers both the treated and control samples, but includes periods from before the treated 
firms become standalone (i.e., the “early” sample).  Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at 
the (three-digit) sic-by-country level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
Panel A: Control firms
Variable (Other current debt)/Assets (Other non-current debt)/Assets (Other current assets)/Assets
Other Shock 0.0174 -0.0040 -0.0092
(0.0383) (0.0048) (0.0096)
Own Shock -0.0545 -0.0053 0.0007
(0.0485) (0.0049) (0.0067)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared (whithin) 0.0011 0.0013 0.0046
N 7262 8819 8964
 
 
Panel B: Early sample
Variable (Other current debt)/Assets (Other non-current debt)/Assets (Other current assets)/Assets
Other Shock -0.0041 0.0017 0.0126
(0.0156) (0.0064) (0.0113)
Other Shock x Treated -0.0333 0.0061 -0.0131
(0.0266) (0.0104) (0.0171)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No
R-squared (whithin) 0.0020 0.0019 0.0006


















Table 12: Testing for demand and geographic spillovers 
Panels A and B present second stage (IV) estimates of stand-alone, instrumented with Other Shock for different sample 
splits. In Panel A we split the sample according to whether firms operate in high elasticity or low elasticity industries. 
High elasticity industries include construction (SIC 15-17), manufacturing of durable goods (SIC 24-25, 32-38), 
wholesale trade of durable goods (SIC 50), retail trade of durable goods (SIC 52, 55, and 57), and Real Estate (SIC 
65). In Panel B we split the sample according to whether firms in a group operate in the same city or in a different 
city. Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-country level. Significant 
at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Panel A: Sample Split by Income Elasticity
Low Elasticity: Non Durables High Elasticity: Durables
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.0949* -0.1583 -0.0780 -0.1572
(0.0537) (0.1038) (0.0725) (0.1017)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12402 14701 6748 7684
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1091*** 0.0905*** 0.1100*** 0.1274***
(0.0174) (0.0165) (0.0328) (0.0300)
Panel B: Sample Split by Group Firms in Same vs Other City
Same City Other City
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.1211** -0.1980** -0.0822 -0.2931*
(0.0557) (0.0975) (0.0877) (0.1776)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11176 13162 4266 5045
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1103*** 0.0976*** 0.0928*** 0.0946***















Table 13: Wealth and Collateral 
This table presents second stage (IV) estimates of stand-alone, instrumented with Other Shock for sample splits based 
on the relative potential loss of owners’ wealth and collateral due to other shock. We construct the variable Wealth-
collateral exposure as Eother/(Eown+Eother)- Tother/(Town+Tother), where E stands for the dollar amount of book equity and 
T for the dollar amount of tangible assets (PP&E). We split the sample for firms with above and below the median of 
this variable. Firms with Wealth-collateral exposure above the median are more “equity exposed” to the other shock 
and firms with Wealth-collateral exposure below the median are more “tangibility exposed” to the other shock. 
Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-country level. Significant at 
the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Sample Split by Wealth-collateral exposure
High wealth exposure High collateral exposure
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.0562 -0.1409 -0.1377** -0.1367
(0.0775) (0.1141) (0.0547) (0.1004)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9430 10020 9266 9950
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1068*** 0.1081*** 0.1027*** 0.0982***






























Table 14: Testing for a risk-tolerance explanation 
Panel A examines firms’ cash holdings over assets. Col. I presents the second stage (IV) estimates of stand-alone, 
instrumented with Other Shock. Col. II presents the OLS estimate. In the bottom of col. I we present the coefficient 
of the instrument, Other Shock, in the first stage regression. Panel B present second stage (IV) estimates of stand-
alone, instrumented with Other Shock, splitting the sample according to the median industry volatility of firms. 
Industry volatility is computed using the standard deviation of industry sales coming from U.S. Compustat firms. 
Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-country level. Significant at 
the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Panel A -Cash




Own Shock Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes






Panel B -Sample Split by Industry Volatility
Low Industry Volatility High Industry Volatility
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.1236* -0.1947** -0.0457 -0.1083
(0.0640) (0.0979) (0.0524) (0.1138)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11069 12904 8081 9481
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1042*** 0.0985*** 0.1212*** 0.1115***

















Other examples of shocks in our sample 
 




SIC 206, Sugar and Confectionery Products. Year 2009. Large increases in input prices. Cocoa 




SIC 242, Sawmills and Planing Mills. Years 2009-2010. The European Commission proposed a 
regulation with the aim of reinforcing the voluntary measures in the FLEGT Action Plan. The 
Regulation was formally adopted at the end of 2010. 
 
SIC 271, Newspapers: Publishing, or Publishing and Printing. Years 2009-2011. Rise in costs of 
ink materials like TiO2, nitrocellulose and other resins like acrylics increased between 50% and 
60% during 2011 and 2012. Reference: http://www.inkworldmagazine.com/the-european-ink-
report 
 
SIC 308, Miscellaneous Plastic Products. Years 2010-2011. Large increase in plastic (input) 
prices. Reference: http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=rubber&months=301 
 
SIC 382, Measuring and Controlling Instruments. Year 2009. Directive 2009/23/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009  (OJ 2009 / L 122 p.6). Codification 
replacing Council Directive 90/384/EEC of 20 June 1990 on the harmonization of the laws of the 
Member States relating to non-automatic weighing instruments (NAWI). This lead to increased 
production costs. Reference:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:294:0007:0009:EN:PDF 
 
SIC 391, Jewelry, Silverware, and Plated Ware. Year 2011. Gold price increased by 30% and silver 













Table A.1: Sample Selection of Industrial Shocks 
This table summarizes the data collection process of the shocks database (Panel A) and how it maps into our final sample of business group firms (Panel B). Panel 
A starts with the number of low-return episodes at the country four-digit-sic code level for which we investigated the presence of exogenous shocks and ends with 
the number of unique industry-year shocks identified. Panel B begins by describing how many of the shocks match firms in our sample according to their industry 
and year. Given the granularity of our shocks and sic-code availability in our business group database, we aggregate shocks at the three-digit sic-code level in the 
merged sample. The panel finally describes the number of observations the shocks in the own and other industry of the focal firm represent, once we define them 
as three-year events.   We define shocks as three-year events, starting the year of the shock and up to two years later, as shocks can motivate business group firms 
to split during the year of the shock or later. 
  
Shocks
Panel A - Shocks data construction Panel B -Shocks in the BG data
# of sic country six-month-returns in the lower 5% 
distribution of returns
5,648 # of unique shocks -Own industry 121
# of negative return spells related to shocks 1,045 # of unique shocks -Other industry 119
# of shocks 359
# of obs. affected by own industry shocks -defined 
as three-year events
7,746
# of commodity shocks 322
% of obs. affected by own industry shocks -defined 
as three-year events
24.3%
# of  regulatory shocks 37
# of obs. affected by other industry shocks -defined 
as three-year events
7,141
% of obs. affected by other industry shocks -








Table A.2: M&A Activity and Shocks 
This table presents results relating mergers and acquisition activity (from Zephyr) with our shocks. The unit of 
observation is a four-digit SIC code-year. We use all the shock data (Table A.1 –Panel A), not just the ones 
matched with our main sample. Columns 1 and 3 use the logarithm of the number of deals as dependent variable, 
while columns 2 and 4 use a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there was an M&A deal in that industry-
year and zero otherwise. Columns 3 and 4 differ from columns 1 and 2 in that in the specifications we exploit 
only within-industry variation by including industry fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted by 








Shock 0.4729*** 0.1442*** 0.0899** 0.0594***
(0.0928) (0.0258) (0.0353) (0.0210)
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared (whithin) 0.0127 0.0095 0.0141 0.0065




































Table A.3: Controlling for country-by-year fixed effects 
This table present our main results (Table 4), but now controlling for country-by-year fixed effects, rather than 
year fixed effects.  Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-
country level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
 
Panel A- Second Stage IV Estimations
Variable Leverage Leverage Leverage Asset Growth Asset Growth Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.1462** -0.1317** -0.1341** -0.3712** -0.3421*** -0.2244**
(0.0695) (0.0619) (0.0624) (0.1578) (0.1289) (0.1116)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Sample restr. to  controls 
data
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 27394 19242 19242 25029 22504 22504
 
Panel B- OLS Estimations
Variable Leverage Leverage Leverage Asset Growth Asset Growth Asset Growth
Stand-alone 0.0030 0.0030 0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0009 0.0030
(0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0062) (0.0072) (0.0055)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Sample restr. to  controls data No Yes Yes No Yes Yes























Table A.4: Other measures of external financial dependence 
Panels A-B present second stage (IV) estimates of stand-alone, instrumented with Other Shock for different 
sample splits. In Panel A we split the sample using above and below the median Industry Equity Dependence. 
In Panel B we split the sample using above and below the median Industry External Financial Dependence. 
Dependence measures are derived from Rajan and Zingales (1998) and are computed using industrial U.S. data. 
Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-country level. 
Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Panel A -Sample Split by Industry Equity Dep. (R&Z)
Low Equity Dependence High Equity Dependence
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.1222* -0.1971* -0.0571 -0.1121
(0.0666) (0.1122) (0.0541) (0.0950)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9778 11515 9372 10870
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1102*** 0.1046*** 0.1126*** 0.1039***
(0.0227) (0.0218) (0.0228) (0.0199)
Panel B -Sample Split by Industry Fin. Dep. (R&Z)
Low Financial Dependence High Financial Dependence
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.0505 -0.2102* -0.1266* -0.1155
(0.0528) (0.1088) (0.0699) (0.1018)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9192 10786 9958 11599
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1107*** 0.0956*** 0.1105*** 0.1105***

















Table A.5: Investor protection 
This table presents second stage (IV) estimates of stand-alone, instrumented with Other Shock for sample splits 
based on the anti-self-dealing index (Djankov et al 2008) which is a measure of investor protection at the 
country level. Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-country 
level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Sample Split by anti-self-dealing index
Low investor protection High investor protection
Variable Leverage Asset Growth Leverage Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.1435** -0.2709** -0.0229 -0.0019
(0.0604) (0.1122) (0.0675) (0.1002)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11533 13588 7617 8797
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.0904*** 0.0827*** 0.1470*** 0.1383***


































Table A.6: Balance 
This table compares the main variable means for firms that become standalone vs firms that remain as business 
groups throughout the sample (Panel A), and for firms that were affected by the instrument (Other Shock) vs 
firms that were not (Panels B and C).  The mean comparisons in Panel A are for the year prior to the split for 
treated firms and their matched controls. The mean comparisons in Panels B and C are based on observations 
prior to the split (for both treated firms and their matched controls), and prior to receiving the Other Shock, in 
case firms were to receive that shock. The data used Panel C differs from that in Panel A in that we exclude 
firms with assets of less than 100,000 euros.  Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
Panel A - Mean differences for second stage:





Leverage 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.90
Assets (million) 1.51 1.53 0.02 0.68
Asset Growth 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.32
Tangibility 0.27 0.27 0.00 0.78
Cash 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.42
Tobin's Q (industry) 2.88 2.88 0.00 0.98
Sales/Assets 1.90 1.84 -0.06 0.24
Panel B - Mean differences for first stage:
Firms that eventually receive "Other Shock" and firms that do not, before both the split and shock
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
Variable No Other Shock Other Shock Difference p-value
Leverage 0.61 0.60 0.00 0.89
Assets (million) 1.53 1.23 -0.31 0.06*
Asset Growth 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.88
Tangibility 0.27 0.27 0.00 0.98
Cash 0.16 0.17 0.01 0.56
Tobin's Q (industry) 2.89 2.88 -0.01 0.95
Sales/Assets 1.88 1.86 -0.02 0.92
Panel C - Mean differences for first stage (Assets >100,000 Euros):
Firms that eventually receive "Other Shock" and firms that do not, before both the split and shock
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
Variable No Other Shock Other Shock Difference p-value
Leverage 0.63 0.64 0.01 0.83
Assets (million) 1.77 1.61 -0.16 0.40
Asset Growth 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.23
Tangibility 0.28 0.27 -0.01 0.72
Cash 0.15 0.13 -0.01 0.49
Tobin's Q (industry) 2.86 2.84 -0.02 0.88
Sales/Assets 1.81 1.68 -0.13 0.56
 
 







Table A.7: Excluding Small Firms 
This table present the results from our main estimations (Table 4 panel A), but excluding firms with assets of 
less than 100,000 euros. Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-
by-country level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
Second Stage IV Estimations (Assets>100,000 Euros)
Variable Leverage Leverage Leverage Asset Growth Asset Growth Asset Growth
Stand-alone -0.1243*** -0.1017*** -0.1006*** -0.2188*** -0.1189** -0.1822***
(0.0417) (0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0795) (0.0568) (0.0676)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Sample restr. to  
controls data
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 23664 17041 17041 21058 19347 19347
First-Stage
Other Shock 0.1000*** 0.1282*** 0.1283*** 0.1039*** 0.1201*** 0.1201***

































Table A.8: Intention to Treat 
This table presents results from an Intention to Treat (ITT) DiD estimation:  We estimate the effect of the 
instrument (Other Shock) directly on firms’ leverage and asset growth. Specifications differ in the additional 
controls included and whether the data is restricted to that available for the additional controls — even if they 
are not included. Standard errors are adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clusters at the (three-digit) sic-by-
country level. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
OLS  ITT Estimations
Variable Leverage Leverage Leverage Asset Growth Asset Growth Asset Growth
Other Shock -0.0092*** -0.0099** -0.0097** -0.0196** -0.0163** -0.0223***
(0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0079) (0.0072) (0.0078)
Own Shock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Sample restr. to  controls 
data
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 27432 19485 19485 24904 22441 22441
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
